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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE C 'F I J I1 MI, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
V. : 
TARA KAY MAST, : Case No. 20000389-CA 
Priority rio. 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION 
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STATEMENT OF THE FIRST ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue i Did the ti ri a] z- :)i n : t e:i ::i : :i i i :i t:s i i iter pretati :: i i :: f t:1 le 
lA copy of the minutes of the "Sentence, Judgmei it, 
Commitment," R 45 47, is attached as Addendum A. 
restitution statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (a) (i) (1999), by 
ordering Ms. Mast to pay $5,090 in restitution related to a 
burglary which she did not admit responsibility for, was not 
charged with, and did not plead guilty to? 
Standard of Review: In reviewing a trial court's order of 
restitution this Court generally examines whether the "'trial 
court exceed [ed] the authority prescribed by law or abuse [d] its 
discretion.'" State v. McBride, 940 P. 2d 539, 541 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997) (quoting State v. Robinson, 860 P. 2d 979, 980 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993)). However, where the propriety of the order depends upon 
interpretation of the governing statute, this Court n"accord[s] a 
lower court's statutory interpretations no particular deference 
but assess [es] them for correctness, as [with] any other 
conclusion of law.'" Id. (quoting State v. Garcia, 866 P.2d 5,6 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) ) . 
Preservation of the Argument: The basis for this appeal is 
preserved on the record at R. 71 [8-9] . 
STATEMENT OF THE SECOND ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue: Did the order to pay $5,090 in restitution, where there 
was neither an admission of responsibility nor a conviction of 
the underlying crime, violate constitutional guarantees of due 
2 
process? 
Standard of Review: "'On review, we give no deference to the 
trial court's determination that defendant's due process rights 
were not violated; however, we presume that the factual findings 
underlying that determination are correct.'" State v. Morgan, 
2000 UT App. 48 %8, 997 P.2d 910 (quoting State v. Parra, 972 
P.2d 924, 926-27 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)). 
Preservation of the Argument: The basis for this appeal is 
preserved at R. 71 [9-10] . 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following provision from the United States Constitution 
is relevant on appeal. The Fifth Amendment provides, in pertinent 
part: 
. . . nor shall any person . . . be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . 
U.S. Const, amend. V. 
The following provision from the Utah Constitution is 
relevant on appeal. Article 1, section 7 provides: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
Utah Const., art. 1 § 7. 
The following statute is determinative of the issue on 
appeal. 
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Restitution, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1999) 
The full text of this statute is provided in Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Ms. Mast was charged by information with one count of 
forgery, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-501(1999), and one count of theft by receiving stolen 
property, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-408(1999). R. 2-4. The forgery charge was dismissed, R. 2, 
R. 16-22, and Ms. Mast pled guilty to the charge of theft by 
receiving stolen property. R. 23-24. Ms. Mast was sentenced on 28 
August 2000 to three years of probation. R. 46. As a condition of 
probation, Ms. Mast was ordered to pay "restitution as determined 
by Probation Officer." R. 47. The judge clarified during the 
sentencing that restitution included the amount of $5,090, the 
total value of property that had been stolen from Mr. Curtis 
Belnap [uMr. Belnap"] during a burglary of his house. R. 70 [4, 
9] . 
Ms. Mast made a motion to alter or amend judgment, asking 
the trial court to strike "approximately $5,000 of restitution 
related to a burglary that Ms. Mast has never been charged with, 
4 
convicted of, nor admitted responsibility to." R. 48.2 A hearing 
was held on 25 September 2000. R. 71. At the hearing, Ms. Mast 
argued that under the restitution statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
201(4) (a) (i) , she should be responsible only for those items she 
was in possession of, and not all of the property taken in the 
burglary. R. 71 [8-9] . The State countered that uthe property is 
a package as a whole and she's got part of it, she should get to 
pay for all of it." R. 71 [9]. The trial court denied Ms. Mast's 
motion. R. 65. Ms. Mast filed a timely notice of appeal. R. 54-
55. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The "Official Version of Offense" in the presentence 
investigation report indicates the following: 
On 3 February 2 000 a deputy from the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Office responded to a call from the Super Target store 
at 7025 South Park Center Drive. R. 72 [2] . Upon his arrival he 
was told that store security personnel had detained someone, 
later identified as Ms. Mast, who had presented a stolen check in 
the amount of $109.75 for payment of her selections. Id. The 
check was drawn on the account of Mr. Belnap, whose house in 
2
 The "Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment" is attached as 
Addendum C. 
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Holladay had been burgled. Id. 
The deputy questioned Ms. Mast. After a few minutes, she 
indicated that she wanted to visit the restroom, and he requested 
that she give him a usmall black pouch" to check. Id. She 
complied. The deputy discovered four men's rings and a gold 
pocket watch, which Ms. Mast indicated were hers. Mr. Belnap was 
contacted and he identified the jewelry as his property. Id. 
The "Official Version of Offense" indicates that u [a]fter 
being advised of her Miranda rights, Ms. Mast stated a male 
friend had given her the checks and the jewelry, but she could 
not remember his name or provide a description of him. She said 
she was at the store with the friend and her 14-year-old 
daughter. She advised the male individual had left the store and 
told her daughter to tell her to pay for the items with one of 
the checks he had given her. The defendant stated she knew the 
checks were stolen. She said she knew Mr. Belnap but denied any 
knowledge of the burglary." Id. 
On 11 May 2000 Ms. Mast pleaded guilty to one count of theft 
by receiving stolen property. R. 16-24. She admitted to being in 
possession of four "rings and a pocket watch [together] worth 
$1,020.00." R. 17. She did not, however, admit responsibility for 
the burglary. See R. 16-24. Ms. Mast was sentenced to three years 
of probation, with the condition that she pay restitution to Mr. 
6 
Belnap in the amount of $5,090. R. 46-47, R. 70 [9] . 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
In ordering Ms. Mast to pay restitution for losses related 
to the burglary of Mr. Belnap's house, the sentencing court 
misinterpreted Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1999). Under section 76-
3-201, restitution may be ordered only if a defendant "has been 
convicted of a crime that resulted in pecuniary damages and 
agrees to pay restitution or admits to the criminal conduct." 
State v. Watson, 1999 UT App. 273 1J3, 987 P.2d 1289. The 
sentencing judge must focus solely upon the "firmly established 
admission[s] of responsibility" and may not order restitution 
based upon further inference. Id. %5. 
Here, Ms. Mast admitted only that she had been in possession 
of some items previously taken in the burglary of Mr. Belnap's 
house. She has continually maintained that she had no knowledge 
of the burglary, did not participate in the burglary, and did not 
know who committed the burglary. See R. 16-22, R. 70 [4], R. 
72 [2-3] . The sentencing court, in ordering Ms. Mast to pay 
restitution for the entire amount of loss from the burglary, 
erred by inferring responsibility based upon her admission of 
theft by receiving stolen property combined with her inability to 
provide further information about the burglary. 
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The court also erred in finding that Ms. Mast's "criminal 
activity" of theft by receiving stolen property met an 
unspecified "civil standard" required to impose restitution. R. 
71 [12-13] . Where pecuniary damages stem from a crime separate 
from the crime admitted by the defendant, the focus is on the 
specific admissions made to the court, and not on an unspecified 
"civil standard." Even applying the modified "but for" test 
sometimes used to find responsibility for losses under section 
76-3-201(4) (a) (i) , State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539, 544 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997), the order for restitution was erroneous. It cannot be 
said that "but for" Ms. Mast's possession of checks, four rings, 
and a pocket watch taken in the burglary of Mr. Belnap's house, 
Mr. Belnap would not have incurred the loss in the burglary. 
Additionally, the order for restitution violeited federal and 
state constitutional guarantees of due process. Fundamental 
principles of due process guarantee a defendant the right to 
"examine and challenge the accuracy and reliability of the 
factual information upon which his sentence is based." State v. 
Gomez, 887 P.2d 853, 855 (Utah 1994). When the sentence includes 
an order for restitution, this guarantee remains applicable. In 
the absence of a conviction where the defendant is afforded an 
opportunity to answer and challenge the accusation, an order for 
restitution may not be imposed unless there is an admission of 
8 
responsibility. "'For purposes of determining the basis of 
restitution, the admission of a defendant is essentially the same 
as a plea of guilty . . . . Because such an admission can result 
in liability for substantial sums of money, defendant's 
responsibility for the criminal activities ought to be firmly 
established." Watson, 1999 UT App. 273 %5. 
Here, charges were not made, an opportunity to answer was 
not afforded, no evidence was presented by either party, and Ms. 
Mast was not convicted of the burglary of Mr. Belnap's house. 
Further, Ms. Mast did not admit responsibility for the burglary. 
The sentencing court simply inferred from Ms. Mast's admission of 
theft by receiving stolen property and her inability to provide 
further information about the burglary that she was responsible 
for the entire amount of loss. R. 71 [10-12]. This failure to 
afford Ms. Mast procedural due process is unconstitutional error 
and should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BECAUSE THE RESTITUTION STATUTE, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-201, 
REQUIRES THE SENTENCING COURT TO FOCUS ON ADMISSIONS, AND 
NOT ON INFERENCES OR AN UNSPECIFIED "CIVIL STANDARD," THE 
RESTITUTION ORDER IMPOSED UPON MS. MAST WAS ERRONEOUS 
In ordering Ms. Mast to pay restitution of $5,090, even 
though she was not convicted of and did not admit responsibility 
9 
for the burglary of Mr. Belnap's house, see R. 16-22, the trial 
court misinterpreted the restitution statute, Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3-201(4) (a) (i) (1999) . Section 76-3-201(4) (a) (i) states: 
When a person is convicted of a criminal activity that 
has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any 
other sentence it may impose, the court shall order 
that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime 
as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for 
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as 
part of a plea agreement. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (a) (i) (1999) .3 The statute defines 
"criminal activities," as "any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant 
admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an 
admission of committing the criminal conduct." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3-201(1) (b) (1999) .4 
In interpreting this statute, this Court has indicated that, 
u
 [a] court may order restitution only if the defendant has been 
convicted of a crime that resulted in pecuniary damages and 
agrees to pay restitution or admits to the criminal conduct." 
Watson, 1999 UT App. 273 %3 • Additionally, "the statute requires 
3
 In interpreting this statute, the ""fundamental rule of 
statutory construction is that statutes are to be construed 
according to their plain language.'" State Ex Re. N.K.C., 1999 UT 
App. 345 19, 995 P.2d 1 (citation omitted). 
4
 Statutory definitions are a primary tool used in 
determining plain meaning. See State v. Watson, 1999 UT App. 273 
f3, 987 P.2d 1289; State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 937 (Utah 1998). 
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that responsibility for the criminal conduct be firmly 
established, much like a guilty plea, before the court can order 
restitution." Id. at %5. Further, as under the Oregon restitution 
statute that served as a model for the section 76-3-201, the 
''formalities of an admission [must be] met before restitution can 
be ordered." Id. (citing State v. Voetbergf 781 P.2d 387, 389 
(Or. App. 1989)). 
In this case, Ms. Mast was not ever convicted of and did not 
ever admit responsibility for the burglary of Mr. Belnap's house. 
She has always maintained that she had no knowledge of the 
burglary, did not participate in the burglary, and did not know 
who committed the burglary. See R. 16-22, R. 70 [4], R. 72 [2-3] . 
Immediately before her arrest, she told police that a male friend 
had given her the checks and jewelry. R. 72 [2] . Later, when Ms. 
Mast pleaded guilty to the charge of theft by receiving stolen 
property, she admitted only that she "possessed the items of a 
former boyfriend, after they had been taken from his home in a 
burglary. The items 4 rings and a pocket watch were worth over 
$1,000.00." R. 17. In the presentence investigation report, she 
further explained: 
A couple of friends of my ex-boyfriend came to my 
apartment. They wanted me to go shopping with them. 
They had some jewelry that they gave me, we were all 
very high on meth. I went up to Target. The guy said he 
had some checks of his and we could buy some things we 
11 
needed. When it came time to cash the check he gave it 
to me and left. I thought it was his check but it 
wasn't. They come from a burglary that was done earlier 
. . . . The jewelry in my purse was also from the 
burglary. 
R. 72 [3] . During her sentencing, the sentencing judge asked "Who 
actually did the burglary at Belnap's home, do you know?" R. 70 
[4]. Ms. Mast responded, "I don't know. It - I don't know. It 
wasn't me, I was not up there." Id. 
Nevertheless, the sentencing court imposed an order of 
restitution for $5,090, the entire amount of loss in the burglary 
of Mr. Belnap's house. The court based its decision upon the 
reasoning that, under an unspecified xxcivil standard" Ms. Mast 
was liable for the entire amount of loss. The court also stated: 
There, it seems to me, is such a close nexus in terms 
of time [between the burglary and when Ms. Mast was 
discovered with the checks and jewelry] and there is 
such a [n] insufficient explanation for how she acquired 
[the 4 rings and pocket watch] and it appears on the 
face of it to be just simply unreasonable and 
unbelievable, frankly. And Ms. Mast's refusal to 
provide any additional information on which I could - I 
could base any other ruling, I'll find that the State 
through the pre[]sentence report in fact has 
established to a sufficient civil standard, [] Ms. 
Mast's participation in a criminal activity resulting 
in an economic loss . . . . 
R. 71 [12-13]. This ruling is erroneous because the court looked 
beyond the admitted crime and based its ruling upon inferences 
made from the "close nexus in terms of time" and Ms. Mast's 
failure to provide further information regarding the person or 
12 
persons who gave her the stolen items. 
In State v. Watson this Court ruled that an order of 
restitution based upon inferences extending beyond the specific 
admission made to the sentencing court was not consistent with 
section 76-3-201. Watson, 1999 UT App. 273 ^5, 987 P.2d 1289. In 
Watson, the defendant pleaded guilty to attempted obstruction of 
justice after allegedly driving two other suspects to and from a 
crime scene. Id. at %2. She also admitted to selling the car used 
in the crime. Id. 
The sentencing court ordered her to pay restitution to the 
Victim's Reparation Fund for money it gave to the victim's family 
for counseling. Id. at %1. In issuing this order, the sentencing 
court stated: 
[T]he defendant did admit to the responsibility of 
driving this vehicle. And in this court's opinion also, 
[defense counsel] , in spite of the fact that you 
maintain that some of the facts are disputed, I am just 
of the opinion that there are sufficient facts, 
substantial as they may be, which are reflective of the 
defendant's state of mind in this particular case; 
i.e., hearing the shots, individuals running towards 
the vehicle, her admission that she drove the vehicle 
away. In this court's opinion [that] is sufficient 
nexus to hold her accountable for restitution . . . . 
Id. at f4. This Court reversed that order, clarifying that "the 
statute is more narrow." Id. at f5. Specifically, the statute 
"does not ask the trial court to analyze a defendant's state of 
mind, but rather asks it to focus on admissions made to the 
13 
sentencing court." Id. Because the defendant admitted only to the 
obstruction of justice charge; and there was no "firmly 
established admission of responsibility upon which to order 
Watson to pay restitution," this Court reversed. Id. at f5. 
Similarly, in State v. Galli, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that the sentencing court incorrectly interpreted section 76-3-
2 01 in ordering the defendant to pay restitution to his family 
for bail money they forfeited when he absconded from the 
jurisdiction after being released on bail. Galli, 967 P. 2d 930, 
937-38 (Utah 1998) . The Court observed that "Galli was neither 
charged nor convicted of bail jumping . . . . Thus, the only way 
that his family could be victims of bail jumping would be if 
Galli admitted responsibility for this crime to Judge Brian." Id. 
Although Galli's defense counsel made statements admitting bail 
jumping, Galli himself did not, and therefore restitution was not 
proper under section 76-3-201. Id. 
In this case, Ms. Mast has already restored the items which 
she was in possession of, R. 71 [9],5 and the only basis for 
5Under the plain language of section 76-3-201(4) (a) (i) , Ms. 
Mast can be ordered to make restitution only for pecuniary 
damages resulting from her admitted crime of theft by receiving 
stolen property. See Watson, 1999 UT App. 273 if3. In her plea 
agreement, she admitted that she had ". . .4) received the 
property of Curtis Belnap 5) knowing the property had been stolen 
6) intending to deprive the owner 7) property consisting of 4 
rings and a pocket watch worth $1,020.00." R. 17. Ms. Mast also 
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ordering further restitution is the burglary of Mr. Belnap's 
house. Ms. Mast was not convicted of and did not admit 
responsibility for that burglary. See R. 16-22. The trial court 
found responsibility for losses from that burglary solely on the 
basis of inferences from Ms. Mast's inability to provide further 
information concerning the burglary. This was erroneous because 
Section 76-3-201 does not contemplate restitution based upon 
inferences or speculation. 
Additionally, the sentencing court's order for restitution 
is erroneous because of the application of an unspecified "civil 
standard" to Ms. Mast's "criminal activity" of theft by receiving 
stolen property. The sentencing court's focus on this standard 
apparently stems from the definition of "pecuniary damages" in 
the restitution statute. "Pecuniary damages" are defined as "all 
special damages, but not general damages, which a person could 
recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of 
the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal 
activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken, 
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including 
earnings and medical expenses." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
admitted, through her attorney, responsibility for these items. 
R. 71 [9] . However, she specifically disclaimed responsibility 
for the value of the remaining losses from the burglery. R. 71 
[8-9] . 
15 
201(1)(c)(1999). 
Under this definition, this Court has found that "a modified 
xbut for' test is appropriate in the context of a restitution 
hearing . . . ." State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539, 544 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997) . Generally, this test is applied in cases where crimes 
of negligence are at issue because of the difficulty of 
determining whether damages resulted from the act of negligence.6 
The test is also used to determine whether parties are victims 
entitled to retribution under the statute.7 
However, where the crime is one of criminal intent rather 
than negligence, the modified "but for" test is not useful 
because pecuniary damages are easier to trace, or not trace, to 
the crime.8 The focus turns to the specific admissions made to 
6
 See e.g. McBride, 940 P. 2d at 544 (Where defendant was 
convicted of joyriding, this Court applied a "modified xbut for' 
test" to determine whether restitution was appropriate) ; State v. 
Robinson, 860 P. 2d 979, 982 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("Unlike most 
criminal matters, these traffic cases involve numerous issues 
that must be considered before it can be determined whether a 
victim 'has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the 
defendant's criminal activities.'") 
7
 See e.g. State v. DepaoLi, 835 P.2d 162, 164 (Utah 
1992) ("Because the cost of the [rape examination] could not be 
recovered by the SLCPD in a civil action against defendant, the 
SLCPD has not sustained pecuniary damages as defined by our 
statute and therefore is not a victim.") 
8
 See e.g Watson, 1999 UT App. 273 1|5 ("Without making 
inferences as the trial court did, it cannot be said that Watson 
admitted responsibility for the murder nor did she agree to pay 
restitution. Watson only admitted and pleaded guilty to the 
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the court, and not to the modified "but for" test.9 In this case, 
the sentencing court focused on an unspecified "civil standard" 
in ordering restitution. The court reasoned that, "as the finder 
of fact and sentencing judge in this matter . . . should I go 
beyond the specific offense for which she was convicted, i.e., 
theft by receiving? I think the answer is yes, but only if there 
is to at least a civil standard, a showing that the-of the 
criminal activity, part of which was the specific offense for 
which she was convicted." R. 71 [12]. The sentencing court found 
that the information in the presentence investigation report met 
the "civil standard," R. 71 [13], and restitution was imposed. 
Because the sentencing court focused on this unspecified "civil 
standard" in ordering restitution, rather than on the specific 
obstruction of justice charge for which there were no pecuniary 
damages. Thus, there was no firmly established admission of 
responsibility upon which to order Watson to pay restitution."); 
State v. Simonette, 881 P.2d 963, 964 (Utah 1994) (Where child 
sustained damages for physical abuse, and defendant admitted 
physically abusing the child, trial court properly ordered 
restitution even though defendant was not convicted of the crime 
of abusing the child.) 
9
 See e.g. Galli, 967 P.2d at 937(Foregoing a "but for" 
analysis, the Utah Supreme Court noted that "Galli was neither 
charged nor convicted of bail jumping . . . . Thus, the only way 
that his family could be victims of bail jumping would be if 
Galli admitted responsibility for this crime to Judge Brian."); 
Watson, 1999 UT App. 273 %5, (In rejecting the sentencing court's 
order of restitution based upon a "but for" test, this Court 
stated, "the statute requires that responsibility for the 
criminal conduct be firmly established, much like a guilty plea, 
before the court can order restitution.") 
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admissions made before the court, the order for restitution was 
erroneous. 
Finally, even applying the modified "but for" test, the 
order for restitution was erroneous. That test, adopted from an 
Oregon court, indicates that VkXif the loss 'resulted,' in a 'but 
for' sense, from defendant's criminal activities,'" restitution 
is proper in the amount ux equivalent of the property for the 
taking or destruction of which the defendant could be found 
civil[l]y liable.'" McBride, 940 P. 2d at 544 (quoting State v. 
Doty, 653 P.2d 276, 277-78 (1982)). Here, it cannot be said that 
"but for" Ms. Mast's acceptance of the checks, rings, and pocket 
watch from a friend, Mr. Belnap's losses from an earlier burglary 
would not have resulted. Mr. Belnap's losses from the burglary 
were not the result of Ms. Mast's admitted crime of theft by 
receiving stolen property. Indeed, Ms. Mast did not even commit 
her admitted crime until after the losses were incurred. 
Therefore, the order for restitution was erroneous. 
II. THE ORDER IMPOSING RESTITUTION VIOLATED PROCEDURAL DUE 
PROCESS BECAUSE MS. MAST, WHO DID NOT ADMIT RESPONSIBILITY 
FOR THE RELATED BURGLARY, WAS NOT CHARGED WITH, PROVEN 
GUILTY OF, OR CONVICTED OF THE BURGLARY 
Without the protections of procedural due process, Ms. Mast 
did not have the opportunity to answer the charge of burglary, 
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she could not confront witnesses or present evidence on her 
behalf, and she was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Procedural Due Process is guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution and Article I, section 7 of the 
Utah Constitution. U.S. Const, amend. V.; Utah Const., art. 1 § 
7. The United States Supreme Court has declared that xx[e]very 
person has a fundamental right to liberty in the sense that the 
Government may not punish him unless and until it proves his 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a criminal trial conducted in 
accordance with the relevant constitutional guarantees." Chapman 
v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465, 111 S.Ct. 1919, 114 L.Ed.2d 
524 (1991) .10 
With regard to the imposition of restitution, this Court has 
indicated that xx[t]he demands of due process rest on the concept 
of basic fairness of procedure and demand a procedure appropriate 
to the case and just to the parties involved." State v. Robinson, 
860 P.2d 979, 982 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citations omitted). 
10
 The Court has also declared, xx [d] ating back to Magna Carta 
. . . it has been an abiding principle governing the lives of 
civilized men that xno freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or 
disseised or outlawed or exiled . . . without the judgment of his 
peers or by the law of the land . . . . (Footnote omitted) . What 
we hold is only that, in keeping with this cherished tradition, 
punishment cannot be imposed 'without due process of law.' Any 
lesser holding would ignore the constitutional mandate upon which 
our essential liberties depend." Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 
U.S. 144, 186 (1963) . 
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Further, u [o]ne of the fundamental requisites of due process is 
the opportunity to be fully heard." Id. (citations omitted). 
Specifically, Me]very significant deprivation, whether permanent 
or temporary, of an interest, which is qualified as 'property' 
under the due process clause must be preceded by notice and 
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case, 
absent extraordinary or unusual circumstances." Id. (citations 
omitted). 
In this case, procedural due process was not followed. 
Charges of the underlying burglary were not made, an opportunity 
to answer was not afforded, no evidence was presented by either 
the State or Ms. Mast, and Ms. Mast was not convicted of the 
burglary. During the hearing on Ms. Mast's motion to alter or 
amend judgment, the court, acknowledging that the State could not 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Mast committed the 
burglary, R. 71 [10]
 /
11
 based its imposition of restitution upon 
an inference of responsibility. See R. 71 [10-12] . The court also 
indicated that it found that Ms. Mast's "criminal activity" of 
theft by receiving stolen property met an unspecified "civil 
11
 During the hearing on Ms. Mast's motion to alter or amend 
judgment, the sentencing judge indicated that "There's absolutely 
no way [the State] could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she 
committed the burglary, they can't put her at the crime scene, 
either. She's presumed innocent. There is no plausible way that 
she should be charged with the burglary . . . ." R. 71 [10] . 
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standard" required to impose restitution under the restitution 
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1999). R. 71 [12-13]. 
The sentencing court's ruling violates procedural due 
process because due process requires more than an inference of 
responsibility during a sentencing proceeding on another 
matter.12 With regard to sentencing proceedings, the Utah Supreme 
Court has indicated that federal and state due process entitles a 
defendant "to due process protections during sentencing to 
prevent procedural unfairness." State v. Gomez, 887 P. 2d 853, 
854-55 (Utah 1994). In fact, "[p]rocedural fairness is equally 
mandated at the sentencing phase as at the guilt phase of a 
trial." State v. Sanwick, 713 P.2d 707, 708 (Utah 1986). Further, 
"[fundamental principles of procedural fairness in sentencing 
When a defendant has not admitted responsibility for a 
crime, or been convicted of the crime, the Utah Supreme Court has 
held it a violation of due process to impose restitution. See ie 
State in Interest of Schroeder, 598 P.2d 373, 374-75 (Utah 
1979)(Where a juvenile admitted to damaging a motor home, Mi]t 
seems to us that it would be a distortion of justice, and of due 
process, for the court to simply assume that other damages caused 
in the area (in this instance the other four motor homes) were 
chargeable to wrongful conduct of this juvenile; and to impose 
that damage as a penalty where, as is the situation here, there 
was no evidence offered, and no admission of guilt on his part, 
upon which to place upon him the responsibility for that 
damage."); In the Matter of Cache Valley Syndicate Trust, 587 
P.2d 525, 528 (Utah 1978) ("It is not consistent with established 
concepts of equity or due process . . . for the court to 
disfranchise . . . without evidence in support thereof" the wife 
of a trust employee who pleaded guilty to charges of felonious 
misconduct with regard to management of the trust.) 
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require that a defendant have the right to examine and challenge 
the accuracy and reliability of the facutal information upon 
which his sentence is based." Gomez, 887 P. 2d at 855. Finally, 
w
 [w] here it is shown on appeal that the belief that the defendant 
may have committed a crime on another occasion is without 
support," sentences have been vacated. State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 
115, 118 n.2 (Utah 1985)(citations omitted). 
In this case, there is no basis for making Ms,. Mast 
responsible for losses related to the burglary of Mr. Belnap's 
house. Although Ms. Mast admitted to theft by receiving stolen 
property, she returned the property which she had been in 
possession of. R. 71 [9]. Inferences of responsibility for losses 
from the underlying burglary cire not permissible under principles 
of due process. No evidence concerning the burglary was 
presented, no opportunity to challenge the evidence was given, 
and Ms. Mast has continually maintained her lack of knowledge 
regarding the burglary. See R. 16-22, R. 70 [4], R. 72 [2-3] . Most 
significantly, no admission of responsibility for the burglary 
was made. A formal admission of responsibility is required under 
principles of due process because xxx [f]or the purposes of 
determining the basis for restitution, the admission of a 
defendant is essentially the same as a plea of guilty . . . . 
Because such an admission can. result in liability for substantial 
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sums of money, defendant's responsibility for the criminal 
activities ought to be firmly established." Watson, 1999 UT App. 
273 %5. Because Ms. Mast did not admit responsibility for the 
burglary underlying Mr. Belnap's losses, the order to pay 
restitution violates procedural due process. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Mast respectfully requests that the order imposing 
restitution be reversed. The sentencing court's imposition of the 
order as a condition of Ms. Mast's probation constitutes a 
misinterpretation of the restitution statute, Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3-201(4) (a) (i) (1999) . Additionally, the order violates 
constitutional guarantees of due process because there was not an 
admission of responsibility, and Ms. Mast was not charged with or 
convicted of the underlying crime. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this tltt day of January, 
2001. 
HEATHER JGKNSON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
JARED W. ELDRIDGE 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TARA KAY MAST, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 001903706 FS 
Judge: ROGER A. LIVINGSTON 
Date: August 28, 2 000 
PRESENT 
Clerk: chandeei 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): ELDRIDGE, JARED W. 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: August 3, 1968 
Video 
Tape Count: 2:14 
CHARGES 
2. THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/11/2000 Guilty Plea 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN 
PROPERTY a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
SENTENCE JA#L 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN 
PROPERTY a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term 
of 180 day(s) 
Credit is granted for time served. 
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00045 
Case No: 001903706 
Date: Aug 28, 2000 
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE 
C/o deft to serve 180 days jail, cts, concurrent. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 2 Fine 
Suspended 
Surcharge 
Total Fine 
Total Suspended 
Total Surcharge 
Total Principal Due 
$1000 
$1000 
$ 
$1000 
$1000 
$0 
$0 
plus : 
00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
Lnterest 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $200.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDARS 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 3 year(s) . 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole, 
Defendant to serve 180 day(s) jail. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any 
Law Enforcement Officer. 
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor 
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law 
Enforcement Officer. 
Participate in and complete any educational; and/or vocational 
training as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and 
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Case No: 001903706 
Date: Aug 28, 2000 
Parole. 
Violate no laws. 
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or 
treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
Pay restitution as determined by Probation Officer. 
Submit to drug testing. 
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise 
distributed illegally. 
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
Report regularly 
Maintain fulltime employment 
Page 3 (last) 00047 
ADDENDUM B 
76-3-201. Definitions — Sentences or combination of sen-
tences allowed — Civil penalties — Restitution 
— Hearing. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities* means any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general 
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil 
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's 
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken, 
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings 
and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, including the accrual of interest from the time of 
sentencing, insured damages, and payment for expenses to a governmen-
tal entity for extradition or transportation and as further defined in 
Subsection (4)(c). 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has 
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal 
activities. 
(ii) ''Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's 
criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a 
person convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or 
combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) to life imprisonment; 
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(g) to death. 
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law 
to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil ppnalty. 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted 
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to 
victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for 
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part, of a plea 
agreement. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as 
defined in Subsection (l)(e). 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court 
shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections 
(4)(c) and (4)(d). 
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of 
the court shall enter an order of complete restitution as defined in 
Subsection (8)(b) on the civil judgment docket and provide notice of 
the order to the parties. 
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the person in whose favor the 
restitution order is entered may seek enforcement of the restitution 
order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In 
addition, the Department of Corrections may, on behalf of the person 
in whose favor the restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution 
order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of 
restitution and the victim or department elects to pursue collection of 
the order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled to recover 
reasonable attorney's fees. 
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when re-
corded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is 
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action. 
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentenc-
ing. 
(vii) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting 
the restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the 
remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 
63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, 
Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is 
convicted of criminal activity in the comity to which he has been 
returned, the com! may, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended 
by any governmental entity for the extradition. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court 
shall consider the criteria in Subsection (4)(c). 
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete 
restitution and court-ordered restitution. 
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to com-
pensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant. 
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court hav-
ing criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the 
criminal sentence at the time of sentencing. 
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be 
determined as provided in Subsection (8). 
(d) (i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inap-
propriate under this subsection, the court shall make the reasons for 
the decision a part of the court record. 
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to enforce the judgment, 
the defendant shall be entitled to offset any amounts that have been 
paid as part of court-ordered restitution to the victim. 
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when re-
corded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is 
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action. 
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentenc-
ing. 
(iv) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting the 
restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the remain-
der of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 63, 
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of 
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the 
defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court 
shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transporta-
tion expenses if the defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another 
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal 
charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of 
governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent 
failure to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Sub-
section (5)(a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported; 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; 
and 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported. 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to 
each defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants 
actually transported in a single trip. 
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that 
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order 
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in 
aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a 
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or 
presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed 
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to 
the time set for sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify impo-
sition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in 
the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports 
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation 
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence 
introduced at the sentencing hearing. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and 
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term. 
(e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing 
guidelines regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstainces promul-
gated by the Sentencing Commission. 
(7) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnaping, rape of 
a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child, 
the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is 
set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or 
found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the 
highest minimum term in state prison. This subsection takes precedence over 
any conflicting provision of law.. 
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense 
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the 
sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A 
victim of an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or 
a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the 
defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or 
pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete 
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage 
to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services 
and devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care, 
including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with 
a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment; 
the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabili-
tation; and the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the 
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and 
(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense 
resulted in the death of a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-
ordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsec-
tion (8Kb) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that 
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obliga-
tions of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment 
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of 
restitution and the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitu-
tion inappropriate. 
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an 
order of restitution if the court determines that the complication and 
prolongation of the sentencing process, as a result of considering an order 
of restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs the need to 
provide restitution to the victim. 
